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 SUMMARY 
Russian outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has been showing a very promising 
performance in recent years. The Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have 
become a key destination, but this is often viewed with suspicion by host countries. 
The paper begins with the quantity and geographical distribution of Russian capital 
investment, pointing to differences between estimates and official OFDI data reported 
on a balance-of-payments basis by the Central Bank of Russia, which are frequently 
revised. In some years, OFDI has exceeded the FDI inflows into Russia, which is very 
unusual for an ex-communist transformation country. It is also paradoxical that FDI 
from relatively poor and less developed Russia should be supporting the economies of 
relatively more developed countries. When the destinations are examined, it emerges 
that some of the FDI is round-tripping and trans-shipping, as a significant proportion 
of the investment is conducted indirectly, through third economies. 
The paper investigates the companies behind the transactions and their various mo-
tives for expanding abroad. The bulk of the OFDI has been coming from natural re-
source-based companies, Russia’s largest exporters, earning well from high world mar-
ket prices for energy sources and raw materials. Having presented the Russian FDI 
position in the CEE region through the statistics of the host countries, the paper sets 
out to describe the main Russian-origin investments and trends in selected CEE coun-
tries. Special attention is paid to the strategic investments in the gas and oil industries 
and the alarming dependence on Russian natural gas and crude oil. It is stressed that 
Russian FDI is managed by mature strategies.  
The paper also looks at the usually negative attitude taken in ex-socialist CEE coun-
tries to companies with Russian capital. The reasons for resistance include memories of 
earlier Soviet policies, fear of losing control over the commanding heights of the econ-
omy, and so-called oil and gas diplomacy, as well as cultural, productivity and effi-
ciency issues. Five case studies are cited to shed light on the probable acquisition 
methods. 
Finally, attention is turned to the prospects for Russian FDI in the CEE countries 
and to some actual privatization opportunities. 
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1) RUSSIAN DIRECT INVEST-
MENT ABROAD: COUNTING 
PROBLEMS 
According to the Central Bank of Russia 
(CBR), Russia’s stock of FDI exceeded 
USD 100 billion at the end of 2004–1 
per cent of the world total and five 
times higher than the Russian figure for 
2000. But care is needed when compar-
ing data. Russia’s international investment 
position is continually being revised by 
the CBR, and uncertainty is expressed in 
many annual reports, notably UNCTAD’s 
World Investment Reports (WIR). Tables 
1, 2 and 3 aim to show how the time 
series, trends and selected ratios are 
changing. 
Some observers believe the stock of 
Russian OFDI had exceeded the above-
mentioned data for 200 by the mid-
1990s. For example Rybkin (1995) and 
Gorshenin (1995) calculated that the 
stock of total investment abroad (direct, 
portfolio and other) was USD 130 billion 
at the beginning of 1995. Khaldin and 
Andrianov (1996) put this at over USD 
300 billion in 1995, with direct and 
portfolio investment each accounting for 
USD 30–40 billion. Bulatov (1998) was 
probably near the truth in saying OFDI 
stock from Russia had reached USD 20–
30 billion by 1997. 
There are four main explanation types 
for differences between these estimates 
and official balance-of-payments figures: 
(i) differences between book value and 
market value of Soviet firms abroad, (ii) 
the fact that Russian investments in other 
former Soviet republics became foreign 
assets after the collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion, (iii) the fact that in some cases, di-
rect investment was registered as portfo-
lio or other investment, and (iv) some 
investment remained unregistered.1 
Russian companies showed very prom-
ising performance abroad in 2003, fol-
lowed by a slowdown in 2004, partly 
because the Russian government 
prompted Russian-based transnational 
corporations (TNCs) to slow their speed 
of expansion abroad.2 The revised FDI 
outflow data of the CBR 2005b and 
WIR 2005 suggest that Russia’s share in 
world OFDI was a relatively low 1.6–1.4 
per cent in 2003 and 2004.  
Since July 2003, capital flight has 
been rising again in response to the 
Yukos case. The round-tripping phe-
nomenon still exists; most FDI from Cy-
prus is actually round-tripping Russian 
capital.3  
In 1992, 2000, 2002 and 2003, FDI 
outflows were higher than FDI inflows 
into Russia, which is highly unusual in 
transformation countries. (However, in-
ward FDI stock consistently exceeded 
OFDI stock.) Moreover, Dunning’s in-
vestment-development path theory does 
not fit Russia. For one thing, it is impos-
sible to define what stage Russia has 
reached. For another, no association be-
tween per capital GDP (level of develop-
ment) and net outward investment can 
be found.4 It is also paradoxical that the 
FDI and other legal and illegal flows 
mean that relatively poor and less devel-
oped Russia is supporting relatively more 
highly developed countries. 
Finally, in global terms, there is a 
strong correlation between total worth of 
billionaires and outward FDI stock, and 
this may explain the high OFDI stock 
estimates.5 According to Forbes, Russia’s 
richest had a combined wealth of USD 
90.6 billion in 2005, putting Russia in 
                         
1 Kalotay 2004, based on Sokolov 1991, 
Gorshenin 1995 and Bulatov 1998. 
2 WIR 2005, 77. 
3 WIR 2000, 65. 
4 Kalotay 2004. 
5 Ibid. 
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third place behind the United States and 
Germany in this respect.  
2) INVESTMENT DESTINATIONS 
It is very difficult to obtain accurate 
data on investment destinations. Much of 
the investment is made indirectly through 
third economies (such as the Bahamas, 
Cyprus, Panama, Singapore, the British 
Virgin Islands, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Austria, Ireland and the United 
States). Nor is it rare for a Russian in-
vestor to set up a company in a host 
economy and for this firm to establish 
another in the same economy, so mask-
ing the ultimate country of residence.  
The main destinations of Russian OFDI 
in 1995–9 were the United States (USD 
1544.2 million; 23.5 per cent), Poland 
(USD 1112.2; 16.60 per cent) and Ger-
many (USD 1053.9 [Table 4]; 15.73 per 
cent).6 From 1994 to 2001, the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
played little role, with shares under 10 
per cent in 1994, 1996 and 2000. There 
was a peak (23.5 per cent) in 1999,7 
but in 2002 and 2003, other CIS coun-
tries took 4 of the top 10 places for 
OFDI from Russia.8 (Table 5) 
2.1 Russian investment in non-CIS 
CEE countries 
According to official statistics, Poland 
was the main CEE destination for Rus-
sian OFDI in absolute terms. But the Bal-
tic States are remarkable in relative 
terms – Russia’s share in total stock of 
OFDI, rank among investors, and OFDI 
                         
6 Kalotay 2003, 11–13. 
7 Kalotay 2004, 6–7. 
8 WIR 2004, 74. 
stock per capita. At the end of 2004, 
the biggest stock of Russian FDI in a 
Baltic state, some  400 million, belonged 
to Lithuania. Meanwhile, excluding Rus-
sia itself, the main CEE targets of Cyp-
riot investment – or investment through 
Cyprus – have been Poland (USD 998.9 
million on July 1, 2003), the Czech Re-
public (USD 469.19 million on June 30, 
2003), Romania (USD 422.43 million on 
September 30, 2002), Hungary (USD 
315.13 million on January 1, 2003) and 
Bulgaria (USD 274.5 million on January 1, 
2003).9 (Table 6) 
Low reported figures since 2002 for 
Russian expansion (mainly acquisitions in 
the oil and gas sectors) have modified 
the comparative FDI positions signifi-
cantly. In 2002 and 2003, only two or 
three of the top five CEE destinations 
announced cross-border merger/acquisi-
tion (M&A) transactions targeted by Rus-
sian firms. (Table 7. See also Appendix 
1.) 
3) COMPANIES, INDUSTRIES 
AND MOTIVATIONS 
 
3.1. Investor companies 
The biggest investors are natural re-
source-based firms, with companies from 
the oil and gas sector (Gazprom, Lukoil, 
Itera, YUKOS and Rosneft) dominant, al-
though ferrous and non-ferrous metals 
are also represented, by RusAl, Norilsk 
Nickel, Severstal and Mechel. The most 
active non-natural resource-based firm is 
OMZ (Uralmash-Izhora group). Table 8 
                         
9 The stock of inward FDI came from Cyprus. 
Pelto et al. 2003. 
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ranks the top 10 Russian-based non-
financial TNCs by foreign assets, accord-
ing to estimates by Vahtra and Liuhto 
(2004a and 2004b). Tables 9 and 10 
show the results of a survey by UNCTAD. 
It is surprising that excluding shipping 
companies, only Lukoil and Norilsk 
Nickel are on the UNCTAD list of the 25 
largest TNCs in the CEE region in 2002. 
Although a company with foreign assets 
of USD 17.2 million was rated in the top 
group, Gazprom was not listed at all. A 
TNC with foreign assets of less than USD 
10.5 billion was ranked 100th in the 
world by UNCTAD in 2002. According to 
Vahtra and Liuhto (2004a and 2004b), 
Gazprom’s assets abroad may have 
reached this size. Table 10 or WIR 2005 
created a new list of top 10 companies 
from South-East Europe and the CIS, led 
by Lukoil, but Gazprom, Itera, Rosneft, 
Severstal and OMZ were not rated. 
In 2002 and 2003, in terms of new 
projects set up abroad, eight of the top 
15 Russian outward-investing firms were 
engaged in natural resource-based activi-
ties (Alrosa, Gazprom, Group Alliance, 
Itera Group, Lukoil, RusAl, RAO UES 
and YUKOS). Of the remaining 7, 3 were 
automotive producers and one each an 
ICT company, a telecom operator, an 
insurance company and a food pro-
ducer.10 
In the financial sector more limited in-
formation is provided. Possibly because 
of the attractiveness of the home market, 
foreign expansion of Russian banks, ex-
cept for Vneshtorgbank and Alfa-Bank, 
lags considerably behind foreign invest-
ment by non-financial corporations. Ac-
cording to Liuhto and Jumpponen’s 2003 
bank survey, the most foreign assets are 
owned by Vneshtorgbank, Alfa-Bank, 
Promsvyazbank, Gazprombank, Evrotrast, 
Russian Interregional Bank for Develop-
ment, Lanta-Bank and Kreditny Agro-
prombank. 
                         
10 WIR 2004, 74. 
3.2. Motives 
The motivation to be detected in the oil 
and gas sector comes from resource-
seeking factors: expansion of the explo-
ration and production base through in-
vestments in the Caspian Sea region, 
Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Columbia, Egypt and 
Kazakhstan (upstream activities). Interna-
tionalization of downstream activities is 
driven by market-seeking and efficiency-
seeking motives. A growing number of 
investors are attracted to refineries and 
distribution infrastructure (sales outlets) 
in the CEE region, the CIS and the 
United States, seeking to be near their 
end-markets and obtain more profit 
through products with greater added 
value – refining capacity in host markets 
can eliminate transportation costs for 
petroleum products. This allows Russian 
oil companies can control the entire 
value chain. Investment in logistic units, 
oil pipelines and seaports in the EU, the 
CIS and the United States secures deliv-
eries and minimizes costs. Good examples 
of this are YUKOS’s strategic asset-seeking 
acquisitions in the Lithuanian Mazeikiu 
Nafta and Slovak Transpetrol. 
The main motives of other natural re-
source-based firms, working in the met-
allurgical sector, are access to protected 
markets in the United States and the EU 
(avoiding export quotas) and diversifica-
tion of their production. An example is 
Severstal’s strategic asset-seeking invest-
ment in the US Rouge Industries. With 
non-ferrous metallurgical firms, resource-
seeking motives lie behind the acquisition 
of 20 per cent of Gold Fields Ltd in 
South Africa by Norilsk Nickel, or Ru-
sAl’s 20 per cent stake in Queensland 
Alumina Ltd (QAL) in Australia. Acquir-
ing a resource base in Africa is also a 
key motive for Alrosa, engaged in the 
diamond industry and present in Angola. 
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For natural resource-based companies, 
a strategic asset or capability-seeking 
motive is common in former socialist 
countries (CEE and CIS), where past ex-
perience and relations may provide some 
competitive advantage over Western 
companies and there are privatization 
possibilities, too. 
Foreign investment by non-natural re-
source-based companies is a recent phe-
nomenon and very modest in scale, be-
cause such firms are less competitive 
and marketable (in terms of product 
and production-quality standards and 
prices), so that they produce for the 
domestic market. Despite this, the Rus-
sian car industry has prospects in the 
CIS, Africa and South America and the 
telecommunications sector very promising 
ones in the CIS, where the competition 
level is not as high as in Russia and the 
market still has considerable growth po-
tential (market-seeking motives). Since 
2001, Russian registered MegaFon and 
MTS have been active in that region, 
and VimpelCom began to expand there 
in 2004. The favoured destinations are 
Ukraine, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. These may 
be joined next by India. 
Other motives suspected include fiscal 
considerations, transfer pricing (over-
invoicing and under-invoicing), and in 
some cases money laundering and for-
eign policy (diplomacy).11 
4) RUSSIAN FDI:           
CEE COUNTRY ANALYSES  
This chapter aims to identify the main 
investments and trends in selected CEE 
countries.  
                         
11 Liuhto and Jumpponen 2003, Vahtra and Liu-
hto (2004a and 2004b), Lisitsyn et al. 2005, 
UNCTAD 2005, 7–8. 
At the end of 2004, Russia’s share in 
total IFDI stock was 1.96 per cent in 
Estonia, 7.3 per cent in Latvia and 8.4 
per cent in Lithuania.12 There are several 
factors behind this notable role in the 
Baltic States. One is historical: the three 
countries were parts of the Soviet Union 
until 1991. Others are that these are the 
only CEE countries with land borders 
with Russia (Lithuania with the exclave 
of Kaliningrad), that the ‘gate’ to the 
Baltic is an important aspect for Russia, 
and that the proportions of Russian 
speakers (Estonia: 29.7 per cent, Latvia: 
37.5 per cent, Lithuania: 8.0 per cent) 
and of ethnic Russians (25.6 per cent in 
Estonia, 29.6 per cent in Latvia and 3.3 
per cent in Lithuania, according to the 
2001 censuses) are significant.13 
Estonia 
A compilation by Estonian Investment 
Agency based on the Commercial Regis-
ter of Estonia and ‘Enterprise Estonia’ 
suggests that at the end of 2004, there 
was a Russian presence in two of the 
60 largest firms with a major foreign 
shareholding: Eesti Gaas AS (19th) and 
Amando Holding OÜ (wholesale; foreign 
shareholder Valery Sikorsky, 41st).14 Gaz-
prom has stakes in all three historical 
gas monopolies in the Baltic States (Eesti 
Gaas, Latvijas Gaze and Lietuvos Dujos), 
holding 37.02 per cent of Eesti Gaas, 
where Itera (through Itera Latvija) also 
owns 9.75 per cent.15 
Lukoil’s presence in the Baltic States 
(and in Belarus) is Lukoil Baltija Group, 
which is managed by Lithuanian Lukoil 
Baltija UAB. The group covers seven 
companies, four of them are registered 
                         
12 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005. 
13 CIA World Factbook 2005. 
14 Estonian Investment Agency (web). 
15 Eesti Gaas 2005, 5. The main activities of AS 
Eesti Gaas are purchase, distribution and sales of 
natural gas, as well as maintenance of gas dis-
tribution systems, construction of new gas pipe-
lines and development of gas distribution net-
works. Eesti Gaas (web). 
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in Lithuania (Lukoil Baltija Servisas UAB, 
Lamantas UAB, Lukoil Kėdainiai UAB, 
Mažeikių autotransporto ūkis UAB), and 
one each in Latvia (Lukoil Baltija R), Es-
tonia (Lukoil Eesti) and Belarus.16 Lukoil 
owns 30 filling stations in Estonia, 31 in 
Latvia and 116 in Lithuania, giving it a 
strong market share in the retail seg-
ment.17 
Expected to have been among the 
largest Russian investments in Estonia in 
2003–5 are a coal terminal in Muuga 
(Kuzbassrazrezugol), a railway rolling-
stock assembly plant in Ahtme (Ural-
vagonzavod), and Severstaltrans’s pro-
jects.18 
AS Coal Terminal, established in June 
2002, is owned by a subsidiary of Kuz-
bassrazrezugol, Russia’s second largest 
coalmining company. At the end of 
2002, the port of Tallinn (the state joint-
stock company AS Tallinna Sadam) con-
tracted with AS Coal Terminal to build a 
coal terminal at Muuga with a capacity 
of 5 million t a year, due for completion 
by 2005.19 
UVZ & AVR, set up in November 
2002, is owned by Russian rolling-stock 
producer Uralvagonzavod and an Esto-
nian transport company AVR Transser-
vice. The plant assembles freight cars in 
Ahtme in NE Estonia and employs over 
100, but this is expected to rise to 
about 400. It obtained ISO 9001:2000 
certification n October 2004 and turned 
out 1345 rail tankers in 2004. In August 
2005, the plant announced it would 
start assembling freight cars for timber 
as well.20 
Severstal’s transportation unit, Sever-
staltrans, is an energetic investor in Es-
tonia, with a 70 per cent stake in 
                         
16 Lukoil Baltija Group (web), Lukoil Baltija R 
(web2). 
17 Lukoil Eesti (web), Lukoil Baltija R (web1), 
Lukoil Baltija (web). 
18 Kornienko 2004. 
19 HSH Nordbank 2005, 4–5, Äripäev Online 
2002. 
20 Äripäev 2005, UVZ & AVR (web). 
Spacecom Ltd, established in 2003. 
Spacecom runs a fleet of 10 diesel loco-
motives, 2 shunters and about 3,500 
tanker cars for shipment of oil and gas, 
making it a major competitor for Esto-
nia’s largest rail freight carrier, Estonian 
Railways. It employs 124. In June 2004, 
Spacecom and its 10 per cent co-owner 
Skinest Projekt bought 84.5 per cent of 
the locomotive repairer Lokomotive in 
Daugavpilsis, where over USD 10 million 
is to be invested.21 
In May 2004, Estonia’s AS Trendgate, 
also linked with Severstaltrans, an-
nounced it would build a new oil termi-
nal at Iru, with a capacity of 240,000 
m3, investing USD 32.45 million in the 
project. Estonia’s two oil terminals, the 
50:50 joint venture Pakterminal (Estonian 
investment firm Trans Kullo and Dutch 
concern Royal Vopak) and Estonian Oil 
Service (controlled by Dutch investment 
firm Baltica Finance) had capacities of 
251,000 and 255,000 m3 respectively, 
but in November 2004, Severstaltrans 
bought 70 per cent of Estonian Oil Ser-
vice, and carried 5.8 million t of heavy 
products in 2003, so becoming the top 
player on the Estonian oil and transit-
trade market. The terminal is located at 
Maardu (like Pakterminal’s) and the 
berth facilities are at Muuga Oil prod-
ucts are delivered to the terminal by rail 
and transported to the port by pipe-
line.22 
In banking, International Bank of St 
Petersburg opened a representative office 
in Tallinn in 2002.23 
Latvia 
Investment by Russian residents in Lat-
vian companies totalled LVL 95.22 million 
LVL or 7 per cent of the total (ranking 
                         
21 Yambaeva 2004. 
22 The Moscow Times 2004a, Estonian Investment 
Agency (2004a and 2004b), Estonian Railways 
(web), Estonian Trade Council 2005, Spacecom 
(web), Äripäev 2004. 
23 IBSP (web). 
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fifth) on December 31, 2004.24 In terms 
of IFDI stock at the end of 2004, the 
largest foreign investors in Latvia were 
Germany (14.9 per cent), Sweden (14.5 
per cent), the Netherlands (9.5 per cent), 
Denmark (8.9 per cent), Estonia (7.7 per 
cent), the United States (7.5 per cent) 
and Russia (7.3 per cent).25 
Two Russian companies, Gazprom and 
Itera are the main actors in the Latvian 
gas industry, as co-owners in Latvijas 
Gaze, the only firm in Latvia engaged in 
natural-gas transportation, storage, dis-
tribution and sales (until July 1, 2007), 
with stakes of 34 and 16 per cent re-
spectively. Gazprom raised its stake in 
Latvijas Gaze to 34 per cent in January 
2005, by acquiring an additional 9 per 
cent per cent from Itera for USD 58 mil-
lion.26 Some 75-85 per cent of Latvia’s 
natural gas imports come from Gazprom 
and the rest from Itera Latvija. As of 
July 2001 Gazprom was among the 20 
foreign companies with the largest in-
vestment in Latvia (USD 19.3 million). 
Russia’s state-run oil product pipeline 
monopoly Transnefteprodukt ranked sec-
ond with its USD 61.8 million investment 
in LatRosTrans SIA, owner and operator 
of main oil pipelines in Latvia totalling 
more than 700 km, which deliver crude 
oil and oil products to terminals at 
Ventspils port and pump crude to 
Lithuania’s Mazeikiu refinery.27 In the 
petroleum downstream sector, Lukoil’s 
Lukoil Baltija R, established in 1993, is a 
leader in the wholesale and retail mar-
kets. It manages two oil depots and 31 
filling stations, of which 23 are equipped 
with modules for selling LPG. The com-
pany employs more than 400.28 
In the banking sector, Moscow Mu-
nicipal Bank–Bank of Moscow holds 
99.87 per cent of Latvijas Biznesa Banka 
                         
24 KPMG 2005. 
25 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005. 
26 The Moscow Times (2005g). 
27 Wetzel 2004. 
28 Lukoil Baltija R (web2). 
(Latvian Businessbank).29 Moscow City 
Government and related entities have 
62.2 per cent of Bank of Moscow’s eq-
uity.30 
Lithuania 
According to Central Bank of Lithuania, 
the largest investors in Lithuania at the 
end of 2004 were Denmark (15.2 per 
cent), Sweden (15.0 per cent), Germany 
(11.4 per cent), Russia (8.4 per cent), 
Finland (7.8 per cent) and Estonia (7.6 
per cent).31 But Russia’s share is thought 
to be higher than that, as its outward 
investors often act through third parties 
such as Swedish firms. Russia has had 
great success in acquiring Lithuanian oil 
and gas companies and chemical and 
power plants. Russia is involved in bank-
ing, and its investors are behind the ex-
ploding real estate market in Vilnius and 
other cities and resort areas. Lithuanian 
Euro-MP Margarita Starkeviciute in 2004 
linked Lithuania’s impressive growth rate 
in 2003 with heavy Russian investment in 
the country. Russian investments in 
Lithuania are highly profitable. 
In 2002, YUKOS acquired a majority 
stake in AB Mazeikiu Nafta, including 
the only refinery in the Baltic States (at 
Mazeikiai), the Birzai pipeline system, 
and the Butinge terminal on the Baltic 
Sea.32 YUKOS paid USD 150 million for the 
stake and signed an agreement for a 
USD 75 million loan to Mazeikiu Nafta, 
guaranteed by the Lithuanian govern-
ment. YUKOS agreed in 2002 to deliver 
at least 5 million t (35 million barrels) 
of crude per year to the refinery, up to 
2012. But for the second quarter of 
2005, the state-owned oil pipeline mo-
nopoly Transneft did not make the vol-
ume for Mazeikiu Nafta available to 
YUKOS, officially because YUKOS had failed 
to deliver agreed volumes in the first 
                         
29 LBB 2004. 
30 Bank of Moscow (web). 
31 Bank of Lithuania 2005, 46. 
32 Yukos (web). 
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quarter. YUKOS severely reduced exports 
in 2004 due to ‘bank-account problems’ 
as part of the tax investigation, and be-
cause in December 2004, 77 per cent of 
YUKOS’s main production unit 
Yuganskneftegaz was sold at auction to 
Baikalfinance Group, which later resold 
the shares to the state-owned Rosneft.33 
TNK–BP, PKN Orlen, Gazprom, Lukoil, 
ConocoPhillips and the Kazakh state-
owned KazMunaiGaz also designs to buy 
stakes in Mazeikiu Nafta. In October 
2005, TNK–BP said that YUKOS wants 
USD 1 billion for the stake.34 
According to the Lithuanian Develop-
ment Agency, at the end of 2002, the 
Luxembourg-based Euro Oil Invest was 
the 23rd biggest investor in Lithuania 
(€29 million in Lukoil Baltija). YUKOS was 
fourth biggest.35 
At the end of March 2003, a consor-
tium of Gazprom, the Lithuanian power 
engineering company Dujotekana and the 
US-based Clement Power Venture (99, 
0.5 and 0.5 per cent) agreed to pur-
chase a combined heat and power plant 
in Lithuania. The locally registered Kauno 
Termofikacine Elektrine (KTE), formed by 
the three investors, agreed to pay LTV 
116.5 million ( 33.7 million) for the 
plant, and the transaction was finalized 
in May. It also agreed to invest LTV 400 
million to develop the plant over 15 
years and to continue supplying Kaunas, 
Lithuania’s second biggest city, with dis-
trict heating and hot water.36 
In 2003 Gazprom obtained 34 per 
cent of the vertically integrated gas mo-
nopoly Lietuvos Dujos, involved in natu-
ral-gas purchase (imports), transmission, 
distribution and sales. (As of December 
31, 2004, Gazprom had a 37.1 per cent 
stake.) In 2002, other activities such as 
LPG and gas equipment production were 
                         
33 The Moscow Times 2005b. 
34 The Moscow Times 2005o. 
35 Lithuanian Development Agency (web). 
36 Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections 2003b. 
separated from the company.37 A total of 
2,928 million m3 of natural gas was im-
ported into Lithuania from Russia in 
2004. Under long-term natural gas pur-
chase and sales agreements, this was 
bought from Gazprom by Dujotekana 
UAB (1020.2 million m3), Lietuvos Dujos 
AB (933.5 million m3), Haupas UAB (16.2 
million m3), Achema AB (751.8 million 
m3) and Kaunas CPH (207 million m3), 
the last two for their own consumption.38 
Haupas UAB started supplying gas di-
rectly to Druskininkai consumers in 
2003. With the liberalization of the gas 
market since 1 January 2004, consumers 
with an annual consumption of over 1 
million m3 have been recognized as eligi-
ble consumers free to choose their sup-
plier.39 Figure 1 shows the situation in 
natural gas supply and consumption in 
2002, with the participation of Itera. 
In addition, Gazprom holds a 30 per 
cent stake in Stella-Vitae, the major gas 
importer in Lithuania until the end of 
2001, but replaced by Dujotekana, 
founded in September 2001. In Decem-
ber 2001, Dujotekana and Gazprom 
signed a gas-supply contract for a pe-
riod of 11 years.40 
In 2002, the largest Baltic phosphate 
fertilizer plant, AB Lifosa, became part 
of EvroKhim (EuroChim), owned by the 
Moscow MDM Group. The Russian min-
eral and chemical group paid  4.5 mil-
lion for the 70 per cent stake, which 
had increased to 91.15 per cent by 
March 2005. With this investment, Lifosa 
obtained a stable source of raw materi-
als, receiving most of them from Ev-
roKhim, while the Russian group ac-
quired an effective distribution channel.41 
Since 2003, Lithuania’s Snoras Bank 
has belonged to the Conversbank Finan-
cial Group, consisting of Enisey Joint-
                         
37 Jankauskas 2005. 
38 UKMIN 2005, 32, UKMIN 2004. 
39 UKMIN 2005, 34. 
40 Energyforum.net 2001. 
41 The Baltic Course 2005, Zashev 2004, 18, 
Rubanov 2003. 
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Stock Bank, Conversbank–Moscow and 
Conversbank. Snoras has 10 regional 
branch offices and 203 mini-banks, and 
had 700,000 clients on October 1, 2005. 
It is third in capital size in Lithuania, 
number of cards issued, and turnover, 
and fourth in volume of assets. Convers-
bank bought into Snoras intending to use 
it as a bridgehead to European business. 
Snoras has plans to buy banks in Latvia, 
Cyprus and Austria.42 In July 2005, it 
opened a representative office in Latvia, 
and in September acquired an 83.01 per 
cent stake in Latvia’s oldest commercial 
bank, Latvijas Krajbanka.43 Snoras also 
has four wholly owned subsidiaries in 
Lithuania.  
Mechel acquired a 75.1 per cent stake 
in the metallurgical plant UAB Mechel 
Nemunas, located in Kaunas, paying USD 
4.0 million dollars in cash in October 
2003. Then in November and December 
2003, it bought the remaining 24.9 per 
cent for USD 1.0 million, again in cash. 
Mechel Nemunas makes wire, nails, rods 
and nets. Production volume in 2003 
was 22,044 t, using semi-finished steel 
from Mechel’s Russian operations.44 
Poland 
Data from the Polish Information and 
Foreign Investment Agency (PAIiIZ) con-
nect almost all the Russian FDI stock in 
Poland with Gazprom. At the end of 
2003, Gazprom had USD 1.284 billion 
invested in Poland, making it seventh 
largest foreign investor in the country 
after France Telecom (USD 4.020 billion), 
the EBRD (USD 2.695 billion), Fiat (USD 
1.769 billion), HVB (USD 1.336 billion), 
Citygroup (USD 1.300 billion) and KBC 
Bank N.V. (USD 1.290 billion). It ac-
counted for over 99 per cent of total 
accumulated Russian IFDI.45 On Decem-
ber 31, 2004 came a drastic fall as 
                         
42 News2biz Lithuania 2005. 
43 Snoras Bank (web). 
44 Mechel 2004, 60 and 108. 
45 Durka and Chojna, eds., 2004, 178–80. 
Gazprom’s divested some USD 800 mil-
lion. This big outflow was the result of 
remittance of liabilities by the entities 
with capital cross-ownership. So at the 
end of 2004, Gazprom ranked only 
45th. Lukoil, operating LPG stations, took 
708th place, with USD 5.5 million, and 
Bagdasarian was in 887th place with USD 
2.6 million. Gazprom has a 48 per cent 
stake in EuRoPol Gaz SA and a 16 per 
cent stake in Gaz Trading SA, as well as 
32 per cent of the telecom network op-
erator Polgaz Telekom SA Gas trans-
porter EuRoPol Gaz SA owns the Polish 
section of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline. 
Gaz Trading SA is engaged in gas mar-
keting and liquefied gas trading. Bag-
dasarian has a 100 per cent stake in the 
factory Sniezka Invest Ltd in Swiebod-
zice, involved in confectionery (chocolate 
candies) and employing about 80 people. 
Russia’s leading outward-investing 
firms have repeatedly addressed the issue 
of the bad climate for Russian invest-
ment in Poland. 
Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic has seen an enor-
mous increase in IFDI flows from Russia 
since 2004. According to the Czech Na-
tional Bank, inward IFDI stock from 
Russia stood at USD 30.7 million at the 
end of 2003, with hotels and restaurants 
accounting for 35.1 per cent, other 
transport equipment 17.9 per cent, and 
health services 19.9 per cent.46 In 2004, 
the country attracted USD 107.8 million 
compared with USD 14.2 million received 
in 2003 (2002 USD 5.2 million, 2001 USD 
2.3 million, and 2000 USD -2.7 million).47 
This was partly thanks to sales of three 
Skoda Holding subsidiaries to OMZ for 
€36 million. Skoda Jaderne Strojirenstvi 
produces equipment for nuclear power 
plants, Skoda Hute and Skoda Kovárny 
speciality steels.48 The related technology 
                         
46 CNB 2005. 
47 CNB (web). 
48 České noviny 2004. 
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and easier access to the markets of 
Eastern Europe were reported reasons 
behind the entrance of the Russian in-
dustrial group. At the end of 2005, 
Gazprom’s German subsidiary ZMB pur-
chased a 37.5 per cent stake in the 
Czech gas wholesaler Gas-Invest. The lat-
est news is that in September 2005, the 
Czech Anti-Monopoly Office approved 
the sale of the Czech Republic’s stake in 
Vitkovice Steel, the country’s largest plate 
maker, to Evraz for CZK 7.05 billion (c. 
€233 million).49 The acquisition is in line 
with Evraz Group’s stated strategy of 
developing its presence in European 
markets.50, St Petersburg’s Ilim Pulp En-
terprise, the largest pulp and paper 
manufacturer in Russia (Europe’s 4th 
and the world’s 11th largest producer of 
market pulp) owns Plzenska Papirna, a 
paper mill employing some 300 people.51 
The Russians also have very significant 
capital investment in hotels and other 
real estate in the famous spa resort of 
Karlovy Vary. 
Slovakia 
Total Russian FDI stock in Slovakia is 
very modest; Russia is not among the 
top 10 investors on which Slovak Invest-
ment and Trade Development Agency 
(SARIO) furnishes data.52 Russia’s FDI po-
sition is estimated to be about USD 90 
million, but the biggest investment, 
YUKOS’s Transpetrol, was made through 
the Dutch-based subsidiary YUKOS Finance 
BV. At the end of 2001, YUKOS won the 
tender with a USD 74 million for 49 per 
cent of the Slovak state-owned pipeline 
company. Transpetrol operates 515 km 
of oil trunk pipeline in Slovakia, with a 
total throughput of 21 million t of oil a 
year. Slovakia wants to buy back these 
shares due to the so-called YUKOS case. 
In October 2005, the Slovak economy 
                         
49 The Moscow Times 2005k. 
50 Evrazholding 2005. 
51 Vahtra and Liuhto 2004a and 2004b, 64. 
52 SARIO (web). 
minister contacted the Slovak ambassador 
in Moscow about this. In February 2005, 
President Putin had already said in Brati-
slava that the Tartar oil company Tatneft 
could be a buyer.53 Gazprom owns 50 
per cent of Slovrusgas, which deals with 
gas transportation and marketing. 
Hungary 
According to Kalotay 2003, between 
1995 and 1999 Russia’s accumulated 
OFDI to Hungary in 1995–9 came to 
USD 32.9 million or 0.49 per cent of all 
Russian FDI.54 Figures from the Central 
Bank of Hungary compiled from corpo-
rate questionnaires suggest that the value 
of the stock of equity capital and rein-
vested earnings by Russian residents at 
the end of 2004 reached €74.1 million 
or 0.22 per cent of the total IFDI stock 
in Hungary. Between 1998 and 2003, 
the Russian share was stable at 0.25, 
0.27, 0.21, 0.25, 0.23 and 0.22 per 
cent, respectively. But the Russian FDI 
stock in euro terms almost doubled in 
those six years. However, Hungary is not 
considered a major target for Russian 
OFDI. 
Until the recent past, Gazprom was 
one of the most significant Russian play-
ers in the Hungarian market. The com-
pany in which it has an interest, Pan-
rusgáz Hungarian-Russian Gas PLC, was 
established in October 1994 by MOL 
Hungarian Oil and Gas Company (50 
per cent) and Gazprom through Gazex-
port (40 per cent) and the British Virgin 
Islands-registered Interprocom & Co. Ltd 
(10 per cent). In terms of net sales 
revenues, Panrusgáz was Hungary’s 
eighth largest company in 2003.55 Its 
main activity is sales in Hungary of 
natural gas originating from Gazprom, 
although it also promoted exports of 
Hungarian products from the outset. 
                         
53 Ïurianová 2005. 
54 Kalotay 2003, 11–13. 
55 Figyelő TOP 200 2004, 28. 
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Until the autumn of 2005, Gazprom 
also held a 25.52 per cent stake in Gen-
eral Banking and Trust Co. Ltd (ÁÉB), 
which joined the Gazprom group in 
1996, when its entire equity was ac-
quired by Gazprombank. As the bank’s 
paid-up capital increased, the ownership 
structure underwent significant change. 
Gazprom’s stake notably decreased, while 
stakes of less than 10 per cent were ac-
quired by several other companies and 
individuals, some of which were consid-
ered by the market to be non-
transparent with an uncertain back-
ground, and some were registered in 
offshore zones: Sharmoor SA (Bahamas), 
Undall International Ltd (British Virgin 
Islands), Milford Holdings Ltd (Ireland), 
Fernmine Ltd (United Kingdom), Pensiero 
Overseas Ltd (Cyprus) and Cubbaren Ltd 
(Isle of Man) were in question. During 
2003 and 2004, these stakes passed to 
Kafijat Trading and Consulting Ltd 
(74.48 per cent), a Hungarian-registered 
company owned by the Russian-born ÁÉB 
chairman and chief executive officer 
Megdet Rakhimkulov, former head of 
Panrusgáz, and his family. He was re-
ported in October 2005 to be the richest 
person in Hungary, with an estimated 
USD 398 million.56 In 2003–4, Kafijat Ltd 
took over IGM Trading and Services Co. 
Ltd, Intergazprom-Invest Holding Co. Inc. 
and Interenergo Trading and Services 
Co. Ltd, which all had portfolio invest-
ments in ÁÉB. In September 2004, Gaz-
prom decided to dispose of its remaining 
25.52 per cent investment, and Kafijat’s 
London-based subsidiary Firthlion Ltd was 
approved to buy the block stake in Oc-
tober 2005.57 Besides Gazprom, Rossiy-
skiy Kredit Bank, Baltiyskiy Bank and 
Vnesheconombank have representative 
offices in Hungary, according to the 
Hungarian Financial and Stock Exchange 
Almanac.58 
                         
56 The Moscow Times 2005n. 
57 Híradó 2005. 
58 HFSEA (web). 
Meanwhile ÁÉB has an 18.1 per cent 
stake in DKG–East Oil & Gas Equipment 
Manufacturing Co. Inc., one of the ma-
jor suppliers to the Hungarian oil and 
gas industry,59 and is sole owner of the 
real estate utilization company Binimex 
Ltd.60 However, in the autumn of 2004, 
ÁÉB sold its 50.11 per cent stake in 
Zalakerámia, engaged in production of 
tiles and construction materials, to Las-
selsberger Ceramics Ltd, the Hungarian 
subsidiary of an Austrian professional 
investor. 
Rakhimkulov’s Firthlion Ltd has a 
15.85 per cent stake in Hungary’s na-
tional broadcaster Antenna Hungária 
PLC. and 10.02 per cent of the Borsod-
Chem chemical complex, which produces 
plastic materials and isocyanate, as well 
as being the largest PVC producer in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Although in 
2000–2002, Gazprom had stakes in the 
Hungarian chemical industry through 
Milford Holdings Ltd and Sibur Interna-
tional Ltd, these have now been shed 
and it no longer has stakes either in 
BorsodChem or the Hungarian olefin and 
polyolefin producer Tiszai Vegyi Kom-
binát (TVK, representing over 20 per 
cent of the region’s petrochemical capac-
ity). However, some market players sus-
pect that BorsodChem’s and TVK’s Aus-
trian-registered shareholders – VCP Vi-
enna Capital Partners Unternehmens-
beratungs AG and its subsidiaries CE Oil 
& Gas Beteiligung und Verwaltung AG 
and VCP Industrie Beteiligungen AG 
(former corporate name: Aurora Holding 
AG) – are closely related to Gazprom. 
Lukoil is also on the Hungarian mar-
ket. Lukoil Downstream Magyarország 
Kereskedelmi Kft. was set up in Septem-
ber 2003 by Amsterdam-based Lukoil 
Europe Holdings BV and British Virgin 
Islands-based Lukoil International Invest 
BVI. Until the end of 2002, Lukoil man-
aged Lukoil Hungary Kereskedelmi Kft., 
and until 2003, there was a trade rep-
                         
59 DKG-East Annual Report 2004. 
60 FigyelőNet 2003b. 
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resentative office in Hungary, too. By 
March 2005, Lukoil had 26 filling sta-
tions in Hungary, with a 1–1.5 per cent 
share in the retail petrol market and a 
2–3 per cent share in the wholesale 
market.61 Lukoil controls Stavrochem 
Chemical Trading Co. Ltd through 
Dutch-based Lukoil Chemical BV and the 
Belgian Lukoil Chemical Trading N.V. 
YUKOS’s Dutch subsidiary YUKOS Finance 
BV established a trade representative of-
fice in Hungary in March 2003 and the 
group was the main crude oil supplier 
to Hungary until the beginning of 2005. 
But after YUKOS’s Geneva-based oil-
trading unit Petroval indicated that deliv-
eries would be missed, MOL signed a 
five-year supply contract with YUKOS’s 
rival, Lukoil, for annual delivery of 5 
million tones of crude oil to Hungary 
and Slovakia.62 
Slovenia 
At the end of 2001, 2002 and 2003, the 
Central Bank of Slovenia reported nega-
tive values for Russia’s total IFDI stocks 
in Slovenia (€1.5, 2.3 and 4.7 million), 
with claims exceeding liabilities, although 
equity capital remained positive. Nor is 
this expected to grow, mainly because 
Russia’s oil and gas companies prefer 
other ex-Yugoslav states, or Romania, 
Bulgaria and Greece in the Balkans. Slo-
venia is a small market with relatively 
strong competition.63 It does not import 
crude oil from Russia, although it re-
ceives Russian oil products. Most of its 
natural gas imports come from Russia, 
but amount to only 0.11 per cent of 
Russia’s natural gas exports by volume 
(2004).64 
                         
61 GVH 2005, Máté 2005, Lukoil Press Release 
2005a. 
62 Bloomberg 2005. 
63 Vahtra and Liuhto 2004a and 2004b, 19.  
64 Gostamkom 2005, 75. 
Romania 
Russian capital is engaged in the Roma-
nian gas, oil, aluminium and steel sec-
tors, as Gazprom, Lukoil, OMZ, RusAl 
and TMK have interests in the country.65 
Some of them are present in the market 
through non-Russian-based subsidiaries, 
so that they are not covered in the offi-
cial statistics, which are not available in 
any case. 
Gazprom, through its German-based 
subsidiary ZGG GmbH, holds a 50 per 
cent stake in WIEE Romania SRL (non-
active) and a 26 per cent stake in Wi-
rom Gas SA (focus on gas import and 
distribution).66 In 1998, Lukoil Europe 
Ltd won a tender to purchase a 51 per 
cent stake in Petrotel refinery in Ploesti 
(for USD 53.2 million), which has since 
increased to 94.7 per cent. Petrotel is 
one of the three refineries Lukoil controls 
outside Russia, the others being Lukoil-
Neftokhim Burgas AD in Bulgaria and 
OAO Lukoil-Odessa Refinery in Ukraine. 
The Petrotel refinery closed down for 
upgrading in mid-2001 and only started 
up again in October 2004. The plant 
produces oil products in line with the 
Euro–3 and Euro–4 standards.67 Accord-
ing to Lukoil-Petrotel, Lukoil invested al-
most USD 570 million in Romania be-
tween 1998 and 2004, of which USD 283 
million was in the refinery and USD 285 
million in the development of Romanian 
retail infrastructure, as Lukoil-Petrotel 
runs 288 filling stations and 10 tank 
farms in the country. Lukoil plans to 
invest another USD 70 million in the 
crude-oil processing industry and USD 50 
million on sales units for oil products in 
2005–7. It controls almost 20 per cent 
of the Romanian market for petroleum 
products, employing around 5000, in-
cluding over 1200 at the refinery.68 In 
September 2003, Lukoil took over MV 
                         
65 Voica (n.d.) 
66 ZGG 2005, 14. 
67 Lukoil (web). 
68 Lukoil Romania (web), Mihailescu 2005, Lukoil 
Press Release 2004b. 
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Properties SRL for USD 121 million, of 
which USD 61 million was debt repayment 
for the previous owner. The firm has 75 
fuel stations and 7 fuel-storage facili-
ties.69  
RusAl, which accounts for a total of 
75 per cent of Russia’s primary alumin-
ium output and 9.9 per cent of global 
primary aluminium supply, acquired 
Cemtrade SA, an alumina refinery in 
Oradea in spring 2000. Although the 
plant was in a desperate state, RusAl 
managed to make substantial improve-
ments, and after an investment of USD 5 
million, alumina production began in 
January 2001. But the situation began to 
worsen in the summer of 2001, as heat, 
electricity and transportation costs rose 
and markets weakened. RusAl tried in 
vain to obtain some concessions from the 
Romanian state. Then it was decided to 
suspend production at Cemtrade indefi-
nitely.70 It is questionable why RusAl did 
not bid for the Romanian aluminium 
smelter Alro in Slatina. If Cemtrade had 
bought it, RusAl would have been able 
to operate under the energy prices im-
posed at that time, saving costs on 
transporting alumina to Siberia.71 The 
most recent information (June 2004) 
showed that efforts had been made since 
March 2004 to restart production.72 
TMK and Mechel each have two in-
terests in Romania. TMK Pipe Metallur-
gical Co., one of the world’s three larg-
est pipe producers, acquired a control-
ling stake in the pipe plant ArtRom SA 
in 2001, and in 2004, a 90.54 per cent 
stake in steelworks Combinatul Siderurgic 
Resita, the third largest manufacturer of 
strips and rolled steel in Romania. It 
was agreed to pay a symbolic  1 for the 
Resita factory, but it was also promised 
to take over the plant’s debts of USD 10 
                         
69 Ernst&Young 2004, Ion 2004, INGfn Romania 
2004, Lukoil 2005, 148. 
70 Albert 2002, Szeghalmi 2001, PR Newswire’s 
News Release 2001, RusAl (web). 
71 Plunkert 2005. 
72 Králik 2004. 
million and to invest USD 15 million in 
development.73 Both firms are owned 
through the Germany-based Sinara Han-
del GmbH, a trading company of TMK. 
Artrom Slatina exports some 80 per cent 
of its output, the most important foreign 
markets being Germany, Austria, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Swe-
den, Norway, Denmark, Great Britain, 
the United States, Canada and the United 
Arab Emirates. There has been a signifi-
cant growth in exports in the recent 
years.74 Mechel, producing 39 per cent 
of total Russian speciality steel output, 
holds through Swiss-based Mechel Trad-
ing AG a 81 per cent stake in SC Indus-
tria Sarmei SA (a manufacture of semi-
finished steel products and steel long 
products), and in COST SA (Combinatul 
de Oteluri Speciale Targoviste, a manu-
facturer of carbon and speciality steel 
long products and of forgings). 
Last but no least, OMZ acquired in 
2001–2 a 66 per cent interest in SC 
UPET SA, a Targovisti-based facility spe-
cializing in the manufacture of mobile 
rings, components for offshore rigs and 
metal valves. UPET’s main export partners 
in 2003 were Ukraine, India, Kazakh-
stan, Syria and Tunisia.75 In May 2004, 
the company (as part of the oil and gas 
equipment and shipbuilding business 
segments) was sold to members of the 
OMZ management.76 
Bulgaria 
The Bulgarian energy sector seems highly 
attractive to Russian OFDI companies. 
Gazprom is present with Topenergy and 
Overgas, Neftochim Bourgas has been 
acquired by Lukoil, and there is a possi-
bility of participation by RAO UES in the 
modernization of Bulgaria’s power sys-
                         
73 Vedomosti 2004, RusTrubProm 2004, Interfax 
2004.  
74 Bulandra 2005. 
75 Voica (n.d.) 
76 OMZ 2005, 22 and 43. 
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tem.77 (Russian capital has positions in 
the Bulgarian hotel sector, too.) 
Topenergy, a gas trading and trans-
port company in Bulgaria, is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Gazprom. Overgas 
Inc. AD, owned 50 per cent by Gaz-
prom, is the biggest private gas retailer 
and private investor in the Bulgarian gas 
market. Besides gas marketing (wholesale 
and retail), Overgas Inc. AD is also en-
gaged in construction and operation of 
gas transportation networks. At the end 
of 2003, Overgas Inc. AD held majority 
stakes in 26 local distribution firms op-
erating in 25 municipalities with a com-
bined population of 2.7 million.78 
In October 1999, Lukoil purchased 
through Lukoil Europe Holdings BV a 58 
per cent stake in Bulgaria’s Neftochim 
Bourgas AD, the biggest refinery in the 
Balkans, along with a petrochemical 
complex producing fuels, petrochemicals 
and polymers, all for USD 101 million. 
(That year, Lukoil produced 7 per cent 
of Bulgaria’s GDP, contributed 25 per 
cent of the country’s tax revenue, and 
employed over 9000. In 2003, Neftochim 
Bourgas was Bulgaria’s largest taxpayer 
and produced 9 per cent of GDP.)79 Lu-
koil’s share in the equity capital was in-
creased to 93.16 per cent in early 2005, 
when the total size of the company’s in-
vestment in the refinery was estimated at 
USD 400 million. The upgrade pro-
gramme at the refinery is expected to 
bring it to the EURO-3 standards in 2007 
and EURO-4 standards in 200980 required 
by EU legislation on the quality of pro-
duced petroleum products and environ-
mental protection; Bulgaria will join the 
EU in 2007.81 
Lukoil Bulgaria Ltd, the commercial 
outlet of the complex, including oil ter-
minals, petrol and gas stations, special-
                         
77 Interfin Capital 2005. 
78 Overgas (web), Sofia Municipality 2004. 
79 Lukoil Bulgaria (web), SofiaEcho.com 2004. 
80 Lukoil Press Release 2004a. 
81 Lukoil 2005, 118 and 150. 
ized in export and trade of fuels, petro-
chemicals (glycols, toluene, styrene, ACN) 
and polymers (LOPE, polypropylene, poly-
styrene, SBR and acrylic fibres). 
For several years, Lukoil has been in-
terested in buying Petrotel AD, the larg-
est fuel retailer in the country with 450 
filling stations (also for LPG), 80 petrol 
depots and 3 port oil terminals. Accord-
ing to public Bulgarian sources, Lukoil 
agreed in December 2004 to buy from 
the majority owner Petrol Holding AD an 
18.3 per cent stake in Petrotel AD worth 
USD 55 million, but the author has no 
information on whether the transaction 
was completed. Petrol AD’s total value 
was estimated at USD 303 million at the 
time. Back in 1999, Lukoil had submitted 
a bid in a privatisation tender for a 51 
per cent stake in Petrol AD.82 
In May 2005, Bulgaria’s Privatization 
Agency chose Unified Energy Systems 
(RAO UES) as buyers for the Varna and 
Ruse thermal power plants, for €578.8 
million and €178.2 million respectively, 
but anti-trust problems meant that nego-
tiations were confined to Varna. At the 
end of October, the planned sale was 
delayed for the sixth time.83 
Despite these investments, preliminary 
data from the Central Bank of Bulgaria 
suggests that the Russian FDI stock in 
Bulgaria in 2004 came to only USD 42.6 
million. However, the Netherlands with 
USD 840.8 million and Cyprus with USD 
475.7 million invested in Bulgaria stand 
at 2nd and 5th largest investment 
sources respectively. Lukoil Europe Hold-
ings BV, for instance, is Dutch-
registered, and the case of Cyprus, 
trans-shipped FDI may mean that some 
of the largest investments have a connec-
tion with Russia. 
                         
82 Lukoil Press Release 1999, The Moscow Times 
2004b, FigyelőNet 2004c, Petrol (web). 
83 The Moscow Times 2004c, e, f, j, m, p, Me-
nedzsment Fórum 2005. 
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Serbia and Montenegro 
According to the Serbian Investment and 
Export Promotion Agency (SIEPA), Lukoil 
was the country’s 4th largest foreign di-
rect investor (€210 million) in 2002–4,84 
after Philip Morris (€518 million), Inter-
brew (€326 million) and Banca Intesa 
(€277 million).85 The privatized Beopetrol 
with 179 filling stations is Serbia’s 2nd 
largest fuel retailer. In 2001, 17 con-
tracts were concluded with Russian firms 
in Serbia, but totalling only €327,100 
(ranked 22nd), as compared with five 
deals completed in 2000.86 The National 
Bank of Serbia suggests that IFDI from 
Russia to Serbia reached €2.6 million in 
2002 (ranked 14th, 2.4 per cent of the 
total), and only a modest increase en-
sued in 2003, when IFDI from Russia 
amounted to €3.4 million (19th, 1.0 per 
cent).87 
In early 2004, the Montenegrin 
Agency for Economic Restructuring and 
Foreign Investment estimated Montene-
gro’s total IFDI stock at just under  500 
million. The main source countries are 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Japan, Russia and the 
United States.88 Russian investors in Mon-
tenegro prefer to buy hotels and land, 
above all on the coast.89 In April 2005, 
RusAl won a tender for a 65.44 per 
cent stake in Kombinat Aluminijuma 
Podgorica (or KAP), an aluminium maker, 
which accounts for half of Montenegro’s 
industrial output and 80 per cent of its 
exports.90 The shares in RusAl were then 
bought up in July 2005 by Basic Ele-
ment, its management company. The 
Montenegrin government announced that 
                         
84 The information is inaccurate; Lukoil offered 
 117 million in ‘cash’ and investment of  85 mil-
lion to develop the company within three years 
of acquisition, as well as  8 million on social 
programmes. 
85 SIEPA (web2). 
86 SIEPA (web1). 
87 SIEPA (web2). 
88 U.S. Commercial Service (web). 
89 Ramusovic 2004.  
90 The Moscow Times 2005d. 
the stake had cost €48.5 million, and the 
new owner would have to invest €55 
million in modernizing the company and 
€20 million on environmental protection 
in Montenegro.91 In the autumn of 2004, 
Russia’s SUAL, one of the top ten alumin-
ium companies in the world, also pur-
chased the tender documentation for the 
privatization of KAP. 
In Serbia, BK Trade has a 51 per 
cent stake in mobile telephone operator 
Mobtel. Until August 2005, Moscow-
based BK Trade was part of the BK 
Group of the Serb Bogoljub Karić, but 
under a May 2005 takeover, it went to 
an Austrian consortium of Martin 
Schlaff, Josef Taus and Herbert Cordt.92 
Russian firm AFK Sistema also showed 
interest in the privatization of Telekom 
Montenegro, later purchased by Hun-
gary’s Matáv (now Magyar Telekom). 
5) RUSSIAN FDI AND           
DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN OIL 
AND GAS  
This chapter discusses the association be-
tween Russian firms’ gas and oil-related 
investment in CEE countries and national 
dependence on Russian natural gas and 
crude oil (Table 11 and 12). 
Gazprom is clearly the leading Russian 
outward investing firm in the CEE gas 
sector. Lukoil’s top position in the oil 
sector is obvious; it owns over 1200 fill-
ing stations in the region. 
The new EU members import 80 per 
cent of their oil and 75 per cent of 
their gas from Russia, compared with 
some 15 per cent and 20 per cent for 
the EU–15. So their efforts to diversify 
are understandable, although their Rus-
sian partners have proved very reliable. 
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The EU–15, on the other hand, intend to 
rely more strongly on Russian oil and 
gas in the immediate future. Unfortu-
nately, Eurostat has yet to give quantity 
data for the external trade. According to 
the value data, 21.8 per cent of the EU’s 
total crude oil imports in 2003 came 
from Russia, as opposed to 14.4 per 
cent in 1999. Russia was the second 
largest oil supplier to the EU–15 
(€19,753 million) after Norway (€20,263 
million). As for EU dependence on Rus-
sian oil products, Russia’s share of deliv-
eries reached 34.3 per cent and in natu-
ral gas 11.5 per cent in 2000, the latest 
year for which figures are available.  
But this dependence on Russia is not 
unilateral, as 15.01 per cent of Russian 
natural gas exports and 13.66 per cent 
of its crude oil exports went to the 
Visegrád countries (Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, Poland and Slovakia) in 2004 
(quantity data).93 Russia, strongly reliant 
on earnings from natural resources, has 
a strong commercial interest in control-
ling national distribution networks.94 
Russian oil and gas companies have 
been keen competitors for major players 
based in this region, such as Austria’s 
OMV, Poland’s PKN Orlen and Hun-
gary’s MOL. Meanwhile some large mul-
tinational and transnational oil corpora-
tions have decided to exit from the 
market. Shell Group sold its Romanian 
filling stations to MOL and was planning 
to dispose of its local LPG unit, Shell Gas 
Romania, by 2005. BP has also been 
withdrawing from Central Europe. In 
December 2002, PKN Orlen obtained 
494 Aral and BP petrol stations in 
Northern Germany as part of a deal in 
which BP gained regulatory approval to 
acquire Veba Oil. In early 2003, OMV 
purchased 55 Hungarian, 11 Slovak and 
247 Southern German Aral filling sta-
tions. In October 2005, OMV bought 70 
                         
93 And almost 20 per cent of Russia’s 2004 
natural gas exports outside the CIS and Baltic 
States went to the V4. 
94 Gostamkom 2005, 72–5. 
petrol stations from BP’s Czech Aral 
unit.95 The Polish Grupa Lotos acquired 
39 Esso stations in Poland from the 
American Exxon Mobil in the summer of 
2005.96 In September 2005, Slovnaft Pol-
ska SA, a member of MOL group, signed 
a preliminary sale agreement with Lotos 
Paliwa, a subsidiary of Grupa Lotos, to 
divest the former’s retail business in Po-
land.97 
Although it is difficult to judge ex-
actly the value of the financial resources 
Russian corporations command, and 
what profit can be made out of a CEE 
acquisition in the long term, it is cer-
tainly untrue that “the Russians will buy 
everything that is available.” There are 
mature strategies behind Russian OFDI. 
In some instances in recent years, Rus-
sian corporations, particularly in the oil 
and gas sector, have not been selected 
as privatization partners or they have 
withdrawn from the tendering process. 
(In what follows, the winner of the ten-
der has been placed in parentheses. In 
some cases, the transaction has not yet 
been completed.) 
Gazprom had intended to buy Roma-
nia’s two main gas distributors, Distrigaz 
Nord and Distrigaz Sud. Distrigaz Sud 
has some 2.5 million customers in South-
ern Romania and Distrigaz Nord 1.3 mil-
lion customers in the north (Ruhrgas and 
Gaz de France in 2004, 31 or 51 per 
cent).98 Gazprom and TNK-BP applied to 
take part in the tender for Romania’s 
Petrom, which possesses two refineries 
with a total capacity of 8 million t (Ar-
pechim and Petrobrazi integrated refining 
and petrochemicals complexes), one fer-
tiliser plant (Doljchim), and a network of 
612 filling stations and 112 terminals. 
The production levels for 2004 amounted 
to 5.46 million t for crude oil and 6.44 
billion standard cu. m for gas (OMV in 
                         
95 Barát and Sándorfi 2005, Népszabadság 2004, 
Energiainfo.hu 2005d, eBroker.hu 2005b. 
96 Energiainfo.hu 2005f. 
97 Budapest Stock Exchange 2005. 
98 Reuters 2004, FigyelőNet 2004a, b. 
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2004, 51 per cent).99 MOL’s gas subsidi-
aries, MOL Natural Gas Transmission PLC, 
MOL Natural Gas Supply PLC and MOL 
Natural Gas Storage PLC, along with 
Panrusgáz Hungarian-Russian Gas PLC 
seemed to be very attractive targets for 
Gazprom (E.on Ruhrgas International in 
2004–5; a two-year option on up to 75 
per cent minus 1 of Natural Gas Trans-
mission, 75 per cent minus 1 and five-
year options for remaining 25 per cent 
plus 1 of Natural Gas Supply and Natu-
ral Gas Storage, 50 per cent of Panrus-
gáz; the transactions are subject of ap-
proval.)100 In July 2005, Gazprom de-
cided not to exercise an option to buy 
for $900 million a 16.3 per cent stake in 
the Slovak pipeline operator Slovensky 
Plynarensky Priemysel – SPP – which 
transports Russian gas to European mar-
kets (Ruhrgas and Gaz de France, which 
hold a total of 49 per cent), due to the 
unclear benefits of the deal and plans to 
develop the North European pipeline. 
SPP, an integrated gas company (exclud-
ing exploration and production) covering 
storage, transportation and trade, has 
launched extensive restructuring.101 
Tatneft was interested in the privatiza-
tion of the Czech Unipetrol, a group op-
erating in the chemical sector, primarily 
in crude oil processing, petro-chemistry 
and fertilizer production (Česká rafinér-
ská and Paramo: producers of motor 
fuels, bitumen, lubricants and other 
products related to crude oil processing; 
Chemopetrol, Kaučuk and Spolana: pro-
duction of petrochemical products and 
plastics; Benzina: network of petrol sta-
tions in the Czech Republic; Lovochemie: 
producer of industrial fertilisers and 
other inorganic chemicals; Aliachem: or-
ganic and inorganic chemistry and proc-
essing of plastics). Though Tatneft had 
offered CZK 1 billion more than PKN Or-
len, it was not short-listed (PKN Orlen in 
                         
99 Petrom (web), Petrom 2005. 
100 E.ON 2004. 
101 Index 2004, eBroker.hu 2005a, Energiainfo.hu 
2005c, e, The St. Petersburg Times 2005. 
2004–5, 63 per cent).102 Rosneft, Lukoil 
and Sibneft had also expressed interest 
in acquiring a 25 per cent plus one 
stake in the Croatian INA – Industrija 
Nafte d.d. Zagreb. The short-list also in-
cluded Lukoil and Rosneft. In 2001, INA 
produced 2.0 million tons of crude oil 
and 1.8 billion cubic metres of natural 
gas in Croatia and abroad. INA owns 
and operates two fuel refineries (Rijeka 
and Sisak) and two lube refineries (Ri-
jeka and Zagreb) in Croatia. On Decem-
ber 31, 2001, INA had a network of 397 
petrol stations across Croatia (MOL in 
2003, 25 per cent plus one).103 Inter 
RAO UES – a UES joint venture with the 
nuclear generator Rosenergoatom – was 
among three firms that submitted bids 
for a 66 per cent stake in the Slovak 
state power utility Slovenské Elektrárne, 
including nuclear assets, in August 2004 
(Enel in 2004, 66 per cent).104 In De-
cember 2003, Severstal failed to win the 
tender for Hungary’s steel group Dunaf-
err, for which Russia’s Mechel had also 
announced its intention to bid (Ukrain-
ian-Swiss Donbass-Duferco consortium in 
2003, 79.48 per cent). Russia’s largest 
steel producer Evraz confirmed interest 
in Hungarian DAM Steel, but although 
representatives of the Russian holding 
company had paid a visit to Hungary in 
April 2004, Evraz did not purchase it.105 
6) THREATS  
This chapter analyses the different atti-
tudes to Russian FDI. In developing 
countries, a Russian presence is mostly 
welcomed, sometimes as a counterweight 
                         
102 Unipetrol (web), Tőzsdefórum 2004, Floreno 
2004. 
103 Napi Online 2002a, FigyelőNet (2002b), Új 
Szó 2003, Government of the Republic of Croatia 
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to US dominance. The developed world 
has been mostly neutral on the question 
so far, since it has low economic de-
pendence on Russia, but attention is paid 
to energy-related investments, due to in-
creasing demand for Russian energy 
sources. The ex-socialist CEE countries 
usually feel negative about Russia obtain-
ing capital stakes in companies. In the 
CIS countries, Russian IFDI has had a 
stronger influence and met lower resis-
tance than it has in the CEE countries, 
but some change can be experienced.106 
The reasons for CEE resistance to 
Russian IFDI are these: 
(1) Memories of Soviet politics in the past. 
Historically, there is deep concern 
over this in the Baltic States and in 
Poland. 
(2) Fear of losing control over industries 
of strategic importance or over the 
commanding heights of the economy. 
This became evident when the poten-
tial merger of PKN Orlen and MOL 
Hungarian Oil and Gas Company was 
cancelled in April 2004. A study 
made for the Polish government found 
that the planned merger could end in 
a takeover by YUKOS.107  
(3) Lack of transparency. There is suspi-
cion when the company is not 
transparent or the investors’ real 
intentions are unclear, or the 
acquiring company intends to buy 
indirectly, through other affiliated 
companies, for example offshore firms. 
This was the case with the 
BorsodChem chemical plant in 
Hungary, where Gazprom acquired a 
stake through Irish-based Milford. Yet 
using offshore companies for investing 
abroad is an accepted custom of 
transnationals. Host countries also look 
askance at Russian investors that do 
not follow Western business standards 
(clear company strategy, accounting 
and taxation, public financial and au-
dit reports and other releases). YUKOS                          
106 Liuhto and Jumpponen 2003, 117–19. 
107 Energiainfo.hu 2004. 
was regarded by the market as a 
transparent firm, which was one of 
the main reasons for its buoyant 
share price. YUKOS is the only Russian 
company that has been truly wel-
comed as a direct investor in Central 
Europe. 
(4) Methods supposedly used to acquire a 
selected foreign company. Five negative 
examples that became well known in 
the CEE countries all made the Rus-
sian investors concerned unwelcome. 
(a) In the Ventspils case in Latvia. 
Russia’s state-owned oil pipeline 
monopoly, Transneft, stopped ship-
ping Russian crude oil through the 
port of Ventspils at the end of 
2003, citing technical reasons. 
Transneft almost certainly wanted 
to acquire Ventspils at a fraction 
of its real value, as the Latvian 
government was planning to sell its 
42.68 per cent stake. But the oil 
could only be diverted to Novoros-
siysk on the Black Sea, which is 
frequently disrupted by storms and 
high seas in the colder months, or 
to the new Russian port of Pri-
morsk on the Baltic Sea which is 
iced up for several months a year. 
Companies responded by increasing 
rail shipments, at greater ex-
pense.108 
(b) In the Bulgartabak case, Bulgaria’s 
tobacco holding company was to 
be privatized in 2002. First, Mos-
cow announced it still had claims 
to assets in the group as part of 
Bulgaria’s post-war reparations. 
Russia informed all Western bid-
ders of this, but failed to offer 
documentary evidence. The Bulgar-
ian government cited a 1953 
agreement, under which the Soviets 
could make no further claims on 
Bulgarian assets. Three of the four 
consortia bidding involved Russian 
                         
108 Socor 2003, Zaslavsky 2003, RZD Partner 
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capital. The best offer was made 
by the Sofia-based consortium To-
bacco Capital Partners and the 
Dutch company Clar Innis, the 
only applicant with no Russian af-
filiations. Opening the bids, the 
president of Grandtabak, the Asso-
ciation of Russian Tobacco Dis-
tributors, stated that if the Russian 
interests were not considered, Bul-
garian tobacco products would be 
excluded from the Russian market. 
The failed candidates filed com-
plaints against the privatization, 
and the Supreme Administrative 
Court annulled the Privatization 
Agency decision.109 
(c) The Mazeikiu case in Lithuania fol-
lowed a longstanding national pol-
icy of fending off Russian invest-
ment for reasons of national secu-
rity. Lukoil participation in the 
construction of Butinge terminal in 
exchange for shares was categori-
cally rejected in 1994. In 1997–9, 
the privatization of Mazeikiu Nafta 
also met political resistance, and at 
the end of the process, 33 per 
cent of the shares passed to the 
US firm Williams International.110 
The disappointed Lukoil discovered 
various technical reasons for not 
sending oil, causing a shortage 
that put the refinery out of opera-
tion for a while and caused the 
company heavy losses. In mid-
2001, Mazeikiu Nafta and YUKOS 
signed an oil supply deal, which 
alleviated the supply problems, but 
the company still lost money. Fi-
nally, YUKOS obtained a 53.7 per 
cent stake in the company in 
2002.111 
(d) Russia cut gas supplies to Belarus 
at the end of January 2004 when 
                         
109 The Moscow Times 2005a, Staneva 2002, 
Kamakin 2005, Vatahov 2002, SofiaEcho.com 
2003. 
110 Zashev 2004, 12–16. 
111 Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections 2003a. 
Belarus refused to sell a 51 per 
cent stake in BelTransGaz for USD 
306 million or pay more for Rus-
sian gas.112 Raising oil and gas ex-
port prices in the former Soviet 
states (the ‘near-abroad’ and the 
Baltic) has been on agenda for a 
long time. The issue is not free 
from political considerations, but 
market prices would need to be 
obtained sooner or later. In 2003, 
Belarus was importing natural gas 
at USD 30 per 1000 cu. m, corre-
sponding to the Russian domestic 
price level, and the new price was 
to be USD 50.113 Agreement was fi-
nally reached, but not before the 
Belarus president had threatened 
Putin with re-examining the union 
treaty between the two countries. 
Moreover, Gazprom’s decision to 
cut gas supplies to Belarus also in-
volved a 30 per cent cut in deliv-
eries to Poland. Thus the Polish oil 
and gas company (PGNiG) and 
Norwegian Statoil began discussions 
on a memorandum on cooperation 
for diversifying gas deliveries.114 
The contract, concluded only in 
June 2004, fixed the gas price for 
Belarus at USD 46.68,115 while 
Western European customers were 
paying about USD 185–190. In late 
summer 2005, Gazprom announced 
that its gas price to the Baltic 
States and Moldova would reach 
the European average in three 
years. Latvia is currently paying 
USD 92–4, Lithuania USD 85, Estonia 
USD 90 and Moldova USD 80.116 
Such a drastic increase may jeop-
ardize the introduction of the euro 
in the Baltic States, by accelerating 
the inflation rate.117 Russia also in-
                         
112 HVG 2004a. 
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114 Origo 2004a. 
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tends to sell gas to Ukraine for 
USD 160 instead of the present USD 
50.  
(e) During privatization of Rafineria 
Gdanska in Poland, MOL, a consor-
tium of Lukoil and Rotch Energy 
and later a consortium of PKN 
Orlen and Rotch Energy tried un-
successfully to buy 75 per cent of 
the company. The question of giv-
ing a chance to a Russian strategic 
investor had arisen again. Mean-
while, Piotr Czyzewski, a new 
treasury minister, chose to reor-
ganize the oil sector and dropped 
privatization idea. As a first step 
in June 2003, Rafineria Gdanska 
was merged with three smaller re-
fineries as Grupa Lotos. In July 
2003, Poland’s richest man, Jan 
Kulczyk, had a meeting in Vienna 
with a reputed Russian spy, 
Vladimir Alganov, who introduced 
himself as a manager of RAO UES. 
(At that time, Kulczyk had a 5.6 
per cent stake in PKN Orlen.) Al-
ganov said that a Russian oil com-
pany had paid USD 5 million to the 
Polish privatization minister and to 
the head of the Nafta Polska to 
ensure it won the tender, but the 
company was not sold. Kulczyk 
said that he would be able to 
lobby the Polish president and to 
secure the deal.118 Certain CEE 
countries suspect political motives 
or oil and gas diplomacy behind 
the investments. For example, the 
Russian state has owned more than 
50 per cent of Gazprom directly 
since June 2005, and Rosneft is a 
100 per cent stated-owned com-
pany.119 Moreover President Putin’s 
confidants were appointed to high 
positions in the sector (Gazprom: 
Dmitry Medvedev; Rosneft: Igor 
Sechin; Transnefteprodukt: Vladislav 
                         
118 Szalai 2002, FigyelőNet 2002a, Origo 2002a, 
b, 2003, Napi Online 2002b, The Economist 
2004a, Cienski 2004, Wisniewski 2004. 
119 FigyelőNet 2005. 
Surkov; Transneft: Viktor Khris-
tenko). 
(5) CEE countries question whether there 
are guarantees to validate property 
rights in Russia and what effects vio-
lation of property rights could have 
on a foreign company. This uncer-
tainty is reflected, for instance, in the 
movement of Mazeikiu Nafta share 
prices.120 
(6) CEE countries suspect that Russian 
outward investors accustomed to brib-
ery, corruption and other illegal tech-
niques at home may apply these in 
the host economy as well  
(7) There are CEE doubts that Russian 
investment may reduce productivity 
and efficiency, perhaps jeopardizing 
the acquired company in the long 
term?121 Although domestic or foreign 
investors cannot be expected to oper-
ate a factory at a loss in long term, 
investment and employment obligations 
can be stipulated in privatization 
agreements. According to media 
sources, Lukoil did not meet its first-
year investment commitments in the 
Serbia-based Beopetrol,122 while in-
vestments in Oradea, Romania, by Ru-
sAl123 and in the Croatian Mechel Zel-
jezara by Mechel failed.124 
With questions 6 and 7, there is no 
negative evidence, and with the previous 
points too, it is advisable not to treat 
them as general characteristics of Rus-
sian corporate behaviour abroad. They 
reflect only the kind of concerns taken 
into account by host countries. 
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7) PROSPECTS 
Russia’s transnationals based on natural 
resources have managed to improve their 
financial positions through the big export 
revenues caused by high world market 
prices, and this has allowed them to ex-
pand in the CEE region and globally. 
Privatization purchases present good 
prospects of capital growth,125 although 
only minority stakes are offered in some 
cases. 
The focus of Russian investor interest 
in countries acceding to the EU are Ro-
mania and Bulgaria. At the beginning of 
2006, there is an opportunity to partici-
pate in the privatization of Romania’s 
largest electricity distributor, Electrica 
Mutenia Sud SA (a 67.5 per cent stake), 
which serves about one million customers 
in and around Bucharest.126 Also to be 
finalized in Romania by the end of 2006 
is the privatization of a majority stake in 
the main gas producer Romgaz, which 
according to the Romanian Ministry of 
Economy and Commerce, Lukoil is keen 
to buy. Romgaz has an annual produc-
tion of over 7 billion cu. m.127 
Lukoil’s Bulgarian plans, announced in 
November 2005, are also imposing: to 
invest USD 750 million in developing the 
Neftochim refinery by 2011, and USD 250 
million to extend the Lukoil chain of fill-
ing stations in Bulgaria.128 
                         
125 According to PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Central 
and Eastern European Mergers and Acquisitions 
Survey 2003, the 357 disclosed privatization 
transactions in 2003 were in nine CEE countries: 
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deals in the region, followed by Poland with 114, 
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of deal size or industry involved. PwC 2004,. 8, 
PwC 2005, 7–8. 
126 Világgazdaság 2005b, Finance.cz 2005. 
127 Napi Online 2005. 
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In the Western Balkans, Serbia is 
again a target for Lukoil expansion, 
through even closer cooperation with 
Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS). Lukoil and 
NIS signed in June 2005 a memorandum 
of intent to create a joint venture, which 
may guarantee long-term oil supplies of 
1.5-4.5 million t per year to NIS refiner-
ies.129 The privatization plan for NIS was 
approved by the National Assembly of 
the Republic of Serbia in September 
2005. Certain units of the company, in-
cluding Novi Sad and Pancevo refineries 
and the network of filling stations, will 
be merged into a new company, of 
which no more than 49 per cent will be 
privatized to any single investor.130 
Also in the oil and gas sector, efforts 
are being made for the second stage in 
privatizing INA of Croatia. MOL acquired 
25 per cent plus one share in October 
2003, the remaining stake being retained 
by the Republic of Croatia.131 
Although the government of Bosnia 
agreed in October 2005 to sell fuel re-
tailer Energopetrol to a consortium con-
sisting of MOL and INA, these state-owned 
energy-sector companies will in the near 
future undergo an accelerated privatiza-
tion process, for example of Bosanski 
Brod oil refinery, with a capacity of 4 
million t.132 
Russian outward investing companies 
also have plans to expand in Macedonia. 
Lukoil, under a memorandum of coop-
eration signed with the prime minister in 
June 2005, Lukoil is to build 40 filling 
stations and three oil storage bases in 
Macedonia within 18 months, at a cost 
of USD 50 million.133 Itera and the gov-
ernment also signed a cooperation 
agreement relating to investment projects 
and improvement of infrastructure in 
Macedonia’s energy market. Itera and 
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Toplifikacija AD of Macedonia established 
a joint venture in December 2004 to 
construct a 200 MW gas thermal power 
plant. Implementation of the  120 million 
project was to begin in October 2005 
and be completed within two years. The 
new power plant is expected to generate 
one fifth of the country’s annual electric-
ity output.134 
Of the eight new CEE members of the 
EU, the Baltic States have seen the 
strongest increase in IFDI from Russia. 
Contributing factors include the historical 
relations, the large Russian minorities 
and widespread knowledge of Russian, 
and the geographical position on the Bal-
tic Sea. There was news in the late 
summer of 2005 that a 38.6 per cent 
stake in Ventspils Nafta held by the Lat-
vian state was soon to be sold.135  
Rather than regular increases in Rus-
sian FDI in the Visegrád countries, it is 
expected to grow through occasional 
larger transactions. Interest in Poland is 
focused on shares in PKN Orlen, PGNiG 
and Grupa Lotos. In Hungary, the 11.8 
per cent state stake in MOL could also 
be attractive to Gazprom or Lukoil, but 
strategic investors are still not being wel-
comed.  
The reluctance of CEE countries to re-
ceive Russian investment capital is not 
expected to ease. The size of the Russian 
presence can only be estimated by ana-
lysing company and media sources in 
meticulous detail. 
 
* * * * * 
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Table 1 
End-period stock of Russian FDI, USD, % 
 
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
WIR 2003, USD billion 3.02 12.40 14.73 18.02 – – 
WIR 2004, USD billion 3.02 20.14 32.441 47.68 52.00 – 
WIR 2005, FDI Database Update, USD billion 0.35 20.14 32.44 54.61 72.27 81.872 
CBR 2004, USD billion .. 20.14 32.44 54.61 72.27 – 
CBR 2005a,3 USD billion .. 20.14 44.22 62.35 90.87 103.70 
Russia/World (WIR 2004), % 0.10 0.34 .. 0.66 0.63 – 
Russia/World (WIR 2005), % .. 0.33 .. .. .. 0.844 
Russia/CEE (WIR 2004), % 48.94 76.79 .. 82.27 78.66 – 
Russia/CEE (WIR 2005), % .. 76.77 .. .. .. 81.745 
World rank (UNCTAD FDI Database) .. .. .. 20 21 – 
OFDI stock/GDP (WIR 2004), % 
 World 
 CEE 
1.0 
10.0 
0.9 
7.8 
19.1 
3.7 
.. 
13.8 
22.6 
6.4 
11.9 
23.0 
6.0 
– 
OFDI stock/GDP (WIR 2005), % .. .. .. .. 7.8 14.0 
World .. .. .. .. 19.7 27.0 
 
Notes: UNCTAD uses CBR data. The CEE countries were defined up to 2004 as the following 19: Albania, 
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
For 2005, UNCTAD uses a fresh categorization. The new EU member countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) were reclassified as EU (hence developed 
economies), and the rest as South-East Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Ma-
cedonia, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Ar-
menia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan – formerly in a Cen-
tral Asia group under developing countries. WIR 2005, p. 6) Despite this reclassification, the CEE-related 
proportions in this paper have been recalculated so as not to break the time series. 
1 UNCTAD FDI database. 
2 Estimates. 
3 Revised on July 12, 2005. 
4 Russia (CBR 2005a)/World (WIR 2005, complemented by CBR 2005a) = 1.06 per cent. 
5 Russia (CBR 2005a)/CEE (WIR 2005, complemented by CBR 2005a) = 85.01 per cent. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
FDI flows related to Russia according to the balance of payments 
(USD million) 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Balance -405 189 408 1460 1656 1681 1492 1102 -463 216 -72 -1769 2132
Out 1566 1022 281 606 923 3184 1270 2208 3177 2533 3533 9727 10346
In 1161 1211 690 2066 2579 4865 2761 3309 2714 2748 3461 7958 12479
Notes: 1993: updated on May 12, 2005; 1994–2000: updated on January 5, 2003; 2001: updated on 
January 22, 2004; 2002: updated on April 1, 2004; 2003: updated on January 11, 2005; 2004: updated 
on October 3, 2005. 
Source: CBR 2005b. 
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Table 3 
Russian OFDI and net outflow of private sector capital at end of period 
(USD billion, %) 
 
 1993–
961 
1993–
971 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
WIR 2003, USD billion 4.881 .. .. 3.184 1.270 2.208 3.177 2.533 3.284 – – 
WIR 2004, USD billion .. 1.027 .. .. 1.270 2.208 3.177 2.533 3.533 4.133 – 
WIR 2005, FDI Database 
Update, USD billion .. .. 0.923 3.184 1.270 2.208 3.177 2.533 3.533 9.727 9.601
OFDI/GFCF (WIR 2004), % 1.4 .. .. .. 2.9 7.8 7.3 4.4 5.7 5.2 – 
World .. 5.52 .. .. 10.7 16.1 17.1 10.8 9.0 8.4 – 
CEE .. 0.72 .. .. 1.5 1.8 2.7 2.1 2.6 3.2 – 
OFDI/GFCF (WIR 2005), % .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.7 12.4 9.2 
World .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.7 8.2 8.7 
Net outflow of private 
sector capital (CBR 2005c), 
USD billion 
.. .. 23.8 18.2 21.7 20.8 24.8 15.0 8.1 1.9 9.3 
Russia/world (WIR04), % .. .. .. .. 0.18 0.20 0.27 0.35 0.59 0.68 – 
Russia/world (WIR05), % .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.54 1.58 1.313
Russia/CEE (WIR04), % .. .. .. .. 54.65 89.76 78.95 71.43 72.46 58.76 – 
Russia/CEE (WIR05), % .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 71.55 76.95 76.044
World rank (UNCTAD FDI 
Database) .. ..  .. .. .. .. .. 22 17 – 
Notes: GFCF: gross fixed capital formation. 
1 Annual averages. 
2 Annual averages 1992–7. 
3 Russia (CBR 2005b)/World (WIR 2005, complemented by CBR 2005b) =1.42 per cent. 
4 Russia (CBR 2005b)/CEE (WIR 2005, complemented by CBR 2005b) =77.37 per cent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Main destinations of the Russian FDI out-
flows, 1995–9 
 
Host country USD million % 
United States  1544.2 23.05 
Germany 1053.9 15.73 
Estonia 34.2 0.51 
Latvia 94.7 1.41 
Lithuania 2.7 0.04 
Poland  1112.2 16.60 
Czech Republic 11.7 0.17 
Slovakia .. .. 
Hungary 32.9 0.49 
Slovenia 1.6 0.02 
Romania 3.2 0.05 
Bulgaria 45.4 0.68 
Croatia 10.2 0.15 
Total 6700.3 100.00 
Source: Kalotay 2003, 11–13, and own calcula-
tions. 
Table 5 
The top 10 destinations for OFDI projects 
from Russia, 2002–3, % 
 
Host country Country share 
Ukraine (CIS) 13.9 
Belarus (CIS) 4.8 
China 4.3 
Germany 4.3 
Uzbekistan (CIS) 4.3 
Kazakhstan (CIS) 3.9 
Latvia 3.5 
Romania 3.5 
Egypt 3.0 
Vietnam 3.0 
Top 10 destinations 48.5 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database. 
www.unctad.org/fdistatistics and OCO Consult-
ing, LOCOmonitor (for greenfield projects). In: 
WIR 2004, 74. 
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Table 6 
Stock of inward foreign direct investment (IFDI)  
from Russia in the CEE countries, Malta and Cyprus 
 
Host country December 31 
IFDI stock 
from Russia 
(USD million) 
Russia’s share in
total IFDI stock 
(%) 
Russia’s rank 
among 
investors 
IFDI stock 
per capita 
(usd) 
Estonia 
2004 
2003 
2001 
197.07 
101.24 
43.71 
1.96 
1.45 
1.38 
9 
11 
9 
147.85 
75.95 
32.79 
Latvia 2003 2001 
171.20 
131 
5.28 
5.3 
9 
7 
74.23 
55 
Lithuania 2003 2001 
288.30 
48.00 
5.8 
1.6 
8 
13 
79.91 
13.30 
Poland 
2004 
2003 
2001 
409.1 
1291.90 
1286 
0.48 
1.78 
2.3 
20 
11 
10 
10.59 
33.45 
33.29 
Czech Republic 2003 2001 
30.7 
18.0 
0.07 
0.08 
29 
29 
3.00 
1.76 
Slovakia  2003 (June 30) 2001 (Sept 30) 
< 10.0 
9 
< 0.10 
1.6 
.. 
.. 
.. 
2 
Hungary1 2003 2001 
74.1 
64.1 
0.22 
0.25 
21 
19 
7.39 
6.39 
Slovenia1 2003 2001 
-4.70 
-1.50 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
Romania 2001 (Sept 30) 4 0.05 .. 0.2 
Bulgaria1 
2004 
2003 
20012 
42.6 
49.4 
37.9 (205)
0.60 
1.00 
1.14 (4.6)
17 
15 
15 (8) 
5.72 
6.63 
5.08 (27)
Cyprus 1997–2002 (flow) 284.69 – – – 
Malta 2002 0.00 0.00 .. 0 
 
Notes: 
1 million. 
2 Liuhto and Jumpponen 2003 figures are in brackets. The Central Bank of Bulgaria calculated IFDI 
stock from Russia at USD 144.5 million at end 1999.  
Source: Central banks (Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Czech Republic), Vahtra and Liuhto 2004a 
and 2004b, Liuhto and Jumpponen 2003 (Cyprus, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia), PAIiIZ (Poland), CIA 
World Fact Book (population figures), own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Cross-border M&A deals by Russian firms announced by top five CEE destination countries, 
2002 and 2003 
 
Rank 
by deal 
size 
Target firm Target country 
Stake 
(%) Buyer Seller 
Estimated 
deal size 
(USD m’n) 
Industry Date an-nounced
2002    2003     
2 Beopetrol Serbia 79.5 Lukoil Government 140 Oil Sept. 
3 MV Properties Romania 100 Lukoil Private 121 Oil Sept. 
5 Lietuvos Dujos Lithuania 34 Gazprom Government 32 Gas Sept. 
    2002     
3 Mazeikiu Nafta Lithuania 53.7 yukos Williams Int’l 235 Oil August 
5 Transpetrol Slovakia 49.0 yukos Government 74 Oil April 
Source: Ernst&Young 2004. 
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Table 8 
Top 10 non-financial TNCs based in Russia, 
ranked by foreign assets, excluding shipping companies1 
 
Company Industry Main actors and related millionaires Estimated foreign assets, USD billion
Natural resource based 
Gazprom Oil and gas 
State, Alexei Miller, Alexander Ryazanov, Andrei 
Kruglov, (earlier: Rem Vyakhirev, Vyacheslav 
Sheremet, Alexander Pushkin) 
>10 
Lukoil Oil and gas Vagit Alekperov, Leonid Fedun, Ravil Maganov, (earlier: Ralif Safin) 8-9 
RusAl Aluminium Oleg Deripaska, (earlier: Roman Abramovich) 2.5–3 
Norilsk Nickel Metals Mikhail Prokhorov, Vladimir Potanin 2 
Itera Oil and gas Igor Makarov 1–1.5 
yukos Oil and gas 
Changing course2 
Steven Theede, Bruce Misamor, Yury Beilin 
1 
Rosneft Oil and gas State, Sergey Bogdanchikov 0.5 
Alrosa Diamond State, regional government, Vladimir Kalitin, (earlier: Vyacheslav Shtyrov) 0.5 
Severstal Steel Alexei Mordashov 0.5 
Non-natural resource based 
OMZ Heavy engineering Gazprombank, (Kakha Bendukidze), Mikhail Kosolapov 0.5–1 
Notes: Names of Russia’s 100 richest people in 2004 appear in italics. 
1 See Novoship with USD 1107 million in 2003. 
2 YUKOS millionaires: Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Leonid Nevzlin, Mikhail Brudno, Vladimir Dubov, Platon 
Lebedev, Vasily Shakhnovsky, Sergei Muravlenko, Alexei Golubovich, Yury Golubev, Viktor Ivanenko and 
Viktor Kazakov. 
Source: Vahtra and Liuhto 2004a and 2004b, WIR 2004, Forbes (Russia’s 100 Richest 2004), Kommer-
sant 2004, and company websites. 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Russian firms among the top 25 non-financial TNCs based 
in CEE countries, ranked by foreign assets 
 
Ranking by foreign assets TNI (%) Ranking by TNI Corporation 
’02 ’01 ’00 ’99 ’02 ’01 ’00 ’99 ’02 ’01 ’00 ’99 
Lukoil 1 (5354.0) 1 1 1 33.8 35.0 34.7 29.8 11 10 11 15 
Novoship 2 (962.9) 2 2 – 55.5 55.5 53.7 – 4 4 6 – 
Norilsk Nickel 4 (502.0) – – – 27.2 – – – 13 13 – – 
Primorsk Shipping 5 (331.8) 6 4 5 71.3 63.2 59.4 59.4 1 2 5 6 
Far Eastern Shipping1 10 (123.0) 9 7 7 22.8 22.8 38.8 38.8 18 15 10 8 
Notes: The transnationality index (TNI) is calculated as an average of three ratios: foreign assets/total 
assets, foreign sales/total sales and foreign employment/total employment. Foreign assets (USD millions) 
appear in brackets. 
1 2001 data.  
Source: WIR 2004, 317, WIR 2003, 191, WIR 2002, 112, WIR 2001, 115. 
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Table 10 
Top 10 non-financial TNCs from SE Europe and 
 the CIS, ranked by foreign assets in 2003 
 
Ranking by Assets (USD m’n) Sales (USD m’n) Employment3 
Foreign 
assets 
TNI 
Corporation 
Foreign Total Foreign Total Foreign Total 
TNI 
(%) 
1 4 Lukoil  7247 26574 16260 22118 139291 150000 36.7 
2 10 Norilsk Nickel  1518 5916 1518 11253 1569 96520 13.6 
3 3 Novoship  1107 1213 317 395 65 4782 57.6 
4 2 Pliva d.d. (CR) 925 1629 908 1078 3500 6780 64.2 
5 5 RusAl  691 6085 3660 4509 5490 63458 33.7 
6 1 Primorsk Shipping 3822 442 1042 134 13052 26112 71.3 
7 7 Mechel  121 1835 1048 2050 12578 84982 24.2 
8 6 Podravka Group (CR) 104 571 210 480 1241 7376 26.3 
9 8 Far Eastern Shipping 522 160 572 180 1662 4000 22.8 
10 9 Alrosa 46 4630 886 1955 82 46998 15.4 
Notes: CR: Croatia. 
1 2001 data.  
2 2002 data.  
3 Number of employees.  
Source: WIR 2005, 272. 
 
Figure 1 
Natural gas supply and consumption 
(2002) 
  
 
 
Source: Gagilas 2002. 
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Table 11 
Major gas-related investments in CEE countries 
by Russians and dependence on the Russian natural gas 
 
Host 
economy Investor Company 
Stake
(%) Activity 
I 
(%) 
II 
(%) 
III 
(%) 
Gazprom 37.02
Estonia 
Itera 
Eesti Gaas AS 
9.75 
Marketing of natural gas, devel-
opment of gas transportation net-
works 
.. 0.52 (0.51)
Gazprom 34 Latvijas Gaze 
16 
Marketing of natural gas, devel-
opment and modernization of 
natural gas and service industries Latvia 
Itera 
Itera Latvija 100 Gas delivery and marketing 
100.00 
(..) 
1.23 
(1.05)
AB Lietuvos Dujos 37.1 
Import, marketing of natural gas, 
development of gas transportation 
networks Lithuania Gazprom 
UAB Stella-Vitae 30 Oil, gas and gas refinery prod-ucts trading 
100 
100.00 
(..) 
 
1.62 
(1.72)
EuRoPol Gaz SA 48 
Construction, ownership and op-
eration of Polish section of Ya-
mal-Europe gas pipeline, gas 
transportation Poland Gazprom 
Gas Trading SA 16 Gas marketing, liquefied gas trad-ing 
99 86.81 (89.43) 
3.50 
(4.30)
Czech R. Gazprom Gas-Invest SA 37.5 Gas marketing, distribution and general trading activity 82 
73.27 
(73.07) 
3.68 
(4.25)
Slovakia Gazprom Slovrusgaz 50 Gas transportation and marketing, general trading business 100 
100.00 
(100.00)
2.72 
(4.04)
Hungary Gazprom Panrusgáz Rt. 40 Gas marketing and distribution 81 85.11 (85.53) 
5.12 
(6.05)
Slovenia ..    62 50.91 (60.00) 
0.11 
(0.39)
Wirom Gas SA 26 Gas import Romania Gazprom1 
WIEE Romania SRL 50 Gas distribution 
100 77.97 (91.38) 
2.29 
(2.98)
Overgas Inc. AD 50 
Gas marketing (wholesale/retail), 
construction and operation of gas 
transportation network Bulgaria Gazprom 
Topenergy 100 Gas trading and transportation 
94 100.00 (100.00)
1.58 
(1.66)
Croatia ..    .. 94.59 (100.00)
0.19 
(0.36)
Serbia–M. Gazprom Yugorosgaz 50 Gas trading and transportation .. 100.00 (..) 
1.24 
(1.09)
Bosnia–H. ..    .. .. 0.18 (0.12)
Notes: 1 Through ZGG GmbH. 
I: Dependence on Russian natural gas imports in 2000. Baltic States: The Economist 2004b; others: Liu-
hto 2002, 15.  
II: Russia’s share in natural gas imports by pipeline in 2004 (2003). Flows are on a contractual basis 
and may not correspond to physical gas flows. (Own calculations based on BP 2004 and 2005.) Some-
times Russia’s share is bigger than indicated because Russian-origin or re-exported gas goes to CEE 
countries. 
III: CEE share in Russia’s natural gas export (quantity data) 2004 (2003). Own calculations based on 
Gostamkom 2004, 85; Gostamkom 2005, 75. 
Source: PAIiIZ (Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency), Gazprom 2005a, b; AK&M Online 
News 2005, Energiainfo.hu (various articles); The Moscow Times 2005g; company websites. 
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Table 12 
Major CEE oil-related investments by Russians 
and national dependence on Russian crude oil 
 
Host 
economy Investor Company 
Stake
(%) Activity 
I 
(%) 
II 
(%) 
III 
(%)
Estonia Lukoil1 Lukoil Eesti  .. Fuel trading.  0.58 (0.01)
5.18
 
Transnefteprodukt LatRosTrans SIA 34 
Ownership and operation of oil 
pipeline, transportation of light 
oil products through the terri-
tory. Latvia 
Lukoil1 Lukoil Baltija R .. 
Oil depots, fuel filling stations, 
LPG marketing, wholesale and 
retail. 
1.01 
(0.78)
0.60
 
yukos Mazeikiu Nafta 53.7 Offshore oil terminal, pipeline, refinery. 
Lukoil Baltija UAB .. Holding co. of Lukoil Baltija group. 
Mažeiki  auto-
transporto  kis 
UAB  
.. Transportation of fuels to Lukoil and other petrol stations.  
Lukoil Baltija 
Servisas UAB  .. Operation of petrol stations. 
Lithuania 
Lukoil1 
Lukoil K dainiai 
UAB  .. 
Exploitation of the fuel storage 
facility, wholesale and storage of 
oil products. 
90 
3.42 
(3.61)
0.56
 
Poland Lukoil Lukoil Polska 100 LPG station network, wholesale. 100 8.05 (7.16)
0.13 
 
Czech R. ..    65 1.88 (1.86)
0.00
 
Slovakia yukos Transpetrol AS 49 
Operation of pipeline system, 
transportation and storage of oil, 
telecommunication activities. 
100 2.66 (2.39)
0.02
 
Hungary Lukoil 
Lukoil Down–
stream Hungary 
Kft. 
100 Wholesale and retail trade of fuels, filling stations. 100 
2.54 
(2.26)
0.45
 
Slovenia ..    0 – 0.17
Petrotel-Lukoil 94.7 Refinery, filling stations, tank farms. Romania Lukoil 
MV Properties 
SRL 100 
Fuel stations and fuel storage 
facilities. 
55 0.96 (1.67)
0.08
 
Lukoil Neftochim 
Bourgas AD 93.16
Oil refinery, petrochemical com-
plex. 
Bulgaria Lukoil 
Lukoil Bulgaria 100 
Export and trade in fuels, petro-
chemicals; oil terminals, filling 
and gas stations. 
5 0.23 (1.01)
0.05
 
Croatia ..    .. 0.63 (0.88)
0.01
 
Serbia–M. Lukoil Beopetrol 79.53 Fuel retail, filling stations. .. 0.04 (0.18)
0.05
 
Bosnia–H. ..    .. 0.06 (–) – 
Notes: 1 Lukoil Baltija Group. 
I: Dependence on Russian crude oil imports in 2000. Baltic States: The Economist 2004b; others: Liuhto 
2002, 15.  
II: CEE share in Russia’s crude oil export (quantity data) in 2003 (2004). Own calculations based on 
Gostamkom 2004, 82 and Gostamkom 2005, 72–3. 
III: CEE share in Russia’s oil products export (quantity data) in 2003. Own calculations based on 
Gostamkom 2004 82–3. 
Source: PAIiIZ, Ventspils Nafta (web), Randburg.com (web), Energiainfo.hu (various articles), company 
websites. 
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Figure 2 
Lukoil petrol and LPG stations in selected countries 
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Source: Barát 2005. 
 
 
Table 13 
EU–15 imports of crude petroleum oils (SITC 333)  
and petroleum products (SITC 334 + 335), 1999–2003, 
( € million, %) 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
  mn %   mn %   mn %   mn %   mn % 
Crude oil 7361 14.4 14463 14.1 15590 17.0 17647 20.3 19753 21.8 
Oil products 2932 31.5 5609 31.1 5850 32.5 6075 31.7 6702 34.3 
Sources: External and intra-European Union trade. Monthly statistics. Eurostat, European Commission 
2000/12, 76; 2001/12, 76; 2002/12, 76; 2003/12, 79; 2004/7, 79. 
 
 
Figure 3 
Refining capacity of oil companies in the region, million t per year 
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Source: Portfolio.hu (2005d). 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
M & A purchases by Russia 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of deals 6 3 4 3 14 3 8 11 21 28 27 40 28 
USD million 18 6 245 – 242 2 301 52 225 371 606 8763 949 
Notes: According to UNCTAD definitions, this is recorded at the time of deal closure, but M & A values 
are not necessarily paid out in a single year. The data cover deals involving acquisition of an equity 
stake of more than 10 per cent. They include purchases via domestic and international capital markets, 
which should not be considered as FDI flows. Moreover, M & A data are expressed as the total trans-
action amount of particular deals and not as differences between gross acquisitions and divestment 
abroad by firms from a particular country (here Russia). FDI flows are recorded on a net basis in a 
particular year. (See WIR 2005, pp. 301–2.)  
Source: UNCTAD, cross-border M&A database.  
 
 
Appendix 2 
Other major investments by Russians in CEE countries 
 
Host 
economy 
Investor Company Stake 
(per cent)
Activity 
.. Nitrofert .. 
Fertilizers, processing natural 
gas into ammonia and prilled 
urea 
KuzbassRazrezUgol AS Coal Terminal .. Coal terminal in Muuga 
Uralvagonzavod UVZ & AVR .. Rail carriage assembly plant in Ahtme 
Estonian Oil Service 70 Oil terminal 
Spacecom Ltd. 70 Rail freight carrier 
Lokomotive 84.5 Locomotive repair plant 
Estonia 
Severstal 
(Severstaltrans) 
AS Trendgate .. Oil terminal 
Moscow Municipal 
Bank/Bank of 
Moscow 
Latvijas Biznesa Banka 
(Latvian Businessbank) 99.87 Banking Latvia 
Conversbank Latvijas Krajbanka 83.01 Banking 
Gazprom UAB Kauno Termofikacijos Elektrin  99 Thermal power supply 
EuroChem AB Lifosa (Kedainiai) 91.15 Production of phosphate fertil-izer 
Lukoil Lamantas UAB .. Management of Ventus and Kapsai radio stations 
Mechel UAB Mechel Nemunas 100 Metallurgical plant (wire, nails, nets) 
Lithuania 
Conversbank Bankas Snoras 49.89 Banking 
Gazprom Polgaz Telekom SA 32 Telecommunications 
Poland 
Bagdasarian  nie ka SA (wiebodzice) 100 Manufacture of sugar confec-tionery 
Ilim Pulp Plzenska Papirna .. Paper plant 
Skoda Jaderne Strojirenstvi 100 Production of equipment for nuclear power plants 
Skoda Hute 100 
OMZ 
Skoda Kovárny 100 
Production of speciality steels 
Czech R. 
Evrazholding1 Vitkovice Steel 98.96 Plate maker 
  
46 
Host 
economy 
Investor Company Stake 
(per cent)
Activity 
General Banking and Trust 
Co. Ltd. 100 Banking 
DKG-East Oil & Gas Equip-
ment Manufacturing Co. 18.1 Oil and gas equipment 
Binimex Ltd. 100 Real estate utilization 
Antenna Hungária Plc. 15.85 Broadcaster 
Hungary Firthlion Limited (Kafijat Ltd.) 
BorsodChem 10.02 Producing plastic feedstocks and isocyanate 
ArtRom Slatina  Control Pipe producer TMK (Pipe 
Metallurgical 
Company)3 
Combinatul Siderurgic Resita 
(Resita Steel Works) 90.54 
Production of steel and rolled 
steel products (billets for pipes) 
RusAl Cemtrade SA (Alor Oradea) .. Alumina refinery 
S.C. Industria Sarmei S.A. 81 
Semi-finished steel products, 
steel long products (rolled 
products) 
Romania2 
Mechel4 
COST (Combinatul de Ote-
luri Speciale Targoviste) SA 81 
Carbon and speciality steel long 
products (rolled products), for-
gings 
Basic Element 
(RusAl) 
Kombinat Aluminijuma 
Podgorica SA (KAP) 65.44 
Aluminium processing plant, 
forging plant, rope plant 
Serbia–
M. 
BK Trade Mobtel 51 Mobile telephone operator 
Notes: 
1 On September 12, 2005, the Czech Anti-Monopoly Office approved the sale of the Czech Republic’s 
stake in Vitkovice Steel. The Moscow Times 2005k. 
2 During 2001–2, OMZ acquired a 66 per cent interest in S.C. UPET SA, a Targoviste-based facility 
specializing in manufacturing of mobile rings, components for offshore rigs and metal valves. In May 
2004, the company (as part of the oil and gas equipment and shipbuilding business segments) was sold 
to certain members of the OMZ’s management. OMZ 2005, 22 and 43. 
3 Through Germany-based Sinara Handel GmbH, a trading company of TMK. 
4 Through Swiss-based Mechel Trading AG. ARIS (web). 
Source: Besides those mentioned: PAIiIZ, Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections 2003b, Zashev 2004, Bal-
tic Rim Economies 2005, Kornienko 2004, Vahtra and Liuhto 2004a and 2004b, The Moscow Times 
2004a and 2005d, PrimOnline 2005, Králik 2004, Mechel (web), Mechel 2004, Forum Invest 2003, 
Presidential Decision 2004, and company websites. 
 
